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 Besides technological and economic problems associated with the development and deploy-
ment of missile defence systems, the US missile defence policy has significant political and 
strategic implications. In this article, reactions of states in Northeast Asia to this missile de-
fence policy are outlined. Subsequently, as an alternative to missile defence, a proposal for a 
regional missile limitation regime is presented, which aims at co-operatively reducing the 
threat of missiles through missile control and disarmament and enhancing regional security 
and stability. 
 
In December 2002, US President George W. Bush announced the initial deployment of missile 
defence systems in 2004 to protect the homeland, troops overseas, and friend and allies of the 
United States against the threat of ballistic missiles. Certainly, ballistic missiles, which could be 
used as a means to deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons, are threatening to the security of any country. The United States is not an 
exception. The development and deployment of missile defence systems by the United States, 
however, is very problematic. First, the technological feasibility of effective missile defence is 
still deeply in doubt. Second, the cost-effectiveness of missile defence as a countermeasure to 
the threat of ballistic missiles and/or WMD is questionable. More importantly, whether US mis-
sile defence systems would operate as expected or not, they could have seriously negative 
impacts on security and stability in various parts of the world. In this article, I examine reac-
tions of states in Northeast Asia to the development and deployment of missile defence sys-
tems by the United States and their political and strategic implications, and then present, as an 
alternative to missile defence, a proposal for a regional missile limitation regime, which aims at 
co-operatively reducing the threat of missiles through missile control and disarmament and 
enhancing regional security and stability. 
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The impacts of US missile defence on Northeast Asia 
Since the late 1990s, the US government has regarded North Korea’s ballistic missile capabili-
ties as a major threat not only to US interests in Northeast Asia but also to the security of the 
United States itself, because North Korea has deployed short- and medium-range ballistic 
missiles that could be used to attack US allies as well as its troops in the region and is suspected 
to have been developing long-range ballistic missiles in the hope to acquire military capabilities 
to deter the United States. In the classified National Security Presidential Directive 23, only 
North Korea is specifically referred to as a state ‘aggressively pursuing the development of 
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as a means of coercing’ the United States 
and its allies [1]. 
Now, it is widely known that North Korea has already deployed several different types of 
short-range ballistic missiles that could reach most if not all of South Korea. No Dong, which 
is the longest range ballistic missile that North Korea has deployed, could reach all of Japan [2]. 
This implies that US Forces stationed in both Japan and South Korea could be targets of those 
ballistic missiles from North Korea. 
Although the North Korean government has conducted no ballistic missile flight test 
since the firing of a Taepo Dong-1 missile in August 1998, Washington believes it has not 
given up an ambition to develop long-range ballistic missiles that are capable to attack the US 
homeland. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of the US government of December 2001, 
for example, speculates that ‘the multi-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is capable of reaching parts 
of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload, may be ready for flight-testing.’ 
Then the analysis of the NIE continues as follows: ‘The Taepo Dong-2 in a two-stage ballistic 
missile configuration could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 10,000 km – sufficient 
to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States. If the North uses a third 
stage similar to the one used on the Taepo Dong-1 in 1998 in a ballistic missile configuration, 
then the Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 15,000 km –
sufficient to strike all of North America’ [3].  
Against this backdrop, the US rudimental missile defence capabilities set to be fielded in 
2004 and 2005 include up to 20 ground-based interceptors, 20 sea-based interceptors (Standard 
Missile-3 or SM-3) with three Aegis ships outfitted for their use, an undisclosed number of 
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, and upgraded radar systems to help identify 
and track targets. Both the ground-based interceptors are geared to defend against long-range 
ballistic missiles, while the sea-based interceptors and PAC-3 missiles are designed to defend 
against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles [4]. In Northeast Asia, the Ministry of 
Defence of South Korea and US Forces South Korea announced the deployment of PAC-3 by 
the latter in May 2003 [5]. 
The Japanese government, which has conducted technological research on missile defence 
with the US government but has taken a rather prudent attitude to its development and 
deployment, now seems increasingly interested in developing and acquiring its own systems. 
As the concern about a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea has mounted, the fear of 
its ballistic missile capability has been intensified recently in Japan. Under such circumstances, 
the Japanese government is considering the purchase of SM-3 and PAC-3 from the United 
States [6]. In the meantime, Tokyo is determined to continue the joint technological research 
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with the US government on a sea-based missile defence system (formally known as Navy 
Theater Wide Missile Defence, but now renamed as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence), which 
started in 1999 in the aftermath of the launching of a Taepo Dong-1 missile [7]. It is reported 
that the Japanese government is planning to conduct flight tests of interceptors with the US 
government in 2005 and 2006 for the first time after the beginning of the bilateral technolo-
gical co-operation [8]. 
Taiwan has been showing a keen interest in developing and acquiring missile defence 
systems as well. Undoubtedly, its interest in missile defence is rooted in its concern over 
Chinese short-range ballistic missile forces deployed across the Taiwan Strait. Reportedly, the 
Taiwanese defence officials have been in consultation with the American counterparts on that 
matter [9]. 
Russia and China, two of the most vehement opponents of US missile defence plans in 
past years, reacted coolly to the US announcement of the initial deployment of missile defence 
[10]. Apparently, Moscow, which is now seeking co-operation with the United States and 
NATO in the field of missile defence [11], accepted the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty, 1972), which had been an obstacle to the US missile defence plan, 
and the following decision by the US government to go ahead with the deployment of missile 
defence as unalterable realities in which it is compelled to seek its national interests and 
security. 
In contrast, Beijing has not softened its hostile attitude to missile defence, probably for 
fear that US missile defence systems are designed to counter China’s strategic deterrent against 
the United States, which is now made up mainly with around 20 single warhead inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In this sense, it is noteworthy that, according to a recent 
press report, China succeeded in the flight-testing of a medium-range ballistic missile carrying 
multiple warheads [12]. Although this doesn’t mean that China could deploy operational ballis-
tic missiles with multiple warheads in the near future, such a testing could be interpreted as a 
Chinese effort to counter the development and deployment of missile defence systems by the 
United States. Beijing is also critical to US co-operation on missile defence with regional actors 
such as Japan and Taiwan. 
North Korea has also opposed to the US missile defence programme as well as the joint 
Japan-US co-operation on missile defence. It is not difficult to assume that North Korea, which 
has already been exposed to overwhelming military pressures from Japan, South Korea and the 
United States, views missile defence as an offensive rather than defensive weapon system since 
it can be regarded as being intended to neutralise North Korea’s missile forces by conducting 
military operations against it. Now that the doctrine of pre-emption has been not only es-
poused but also actually practiced by the Bush administration in Iraq, the US missile defence 
systems may appear more threatening than ever before to the North Korean government. 
Nevertheless, it has not taken any concrete countermeasures against the US decision to deploy 
missile defence systems. Actually, it remains committed to its voluntary flight test moratorium 
of long-range missiles, which has been in effect since 1999 and was extended indefinitely in 
September 2002 [13]. 
Thus, fortunately, the development and deployment of missile defence systems by the 
United States has not stimulated other states to build up their missile forces in Northeast Asia. 
This, however, does not mean that the danger of igniting a regional missile arms race has been 
completely eliminated. Besides, such a unilateral approach to mitigate the ballistic missile threat 
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could only nurture distrust among major regional actors, destructing co-operative efforts to 
reduce the missile threat in the region. 
Furthermore, the development and deployment of missile defence systems by the United 
States has not been helpful to reduce the missile threat to its allies and to remove their interest 
in expanding their missile arsenals. Currently, Japan does not have military capabilities to attack 
ground targets in other countries, in line with the doctrine of ‘Senshu Boei’ (defensive defence 
posture). Japan’s Defence Agency, however, is exploring to acquire such capabilities to prevent 
a missile attack against Japan, for example from North Korea. Proposed capabilities include 
air-to-surface missiles [14]. Besides, it is reported that the Japanese government is considering 
even the purchase of Tomahawk cruise missile from the United States [15]. 
South Korea, in turn, has been driven to beef up its missile capabilities to counter short-
range ballistic missiles deployed by North Korea in recent years. Under the Memorandum of 
Understanding on missiles between the governments of South Korea and the United States in 
1979, the former had been prohibited to develop ballistic missiles with a range over 180 km 
and a payload over 500 kg without the consent of the latter [16]. However, as a result of the 
negotiation between the two governments, a new agreement, which allows South Korea to 
develop, possess and deploy ballistic missiles with a range up to 300 km, was concluded and 
Seoul announced a new missile policy in accordance with the bilateral agreement in January 
2001 [17]. In addition, the Defence Ministry of South Korea reportedly concluded a contract 
with Lockheed Martin on the purchase of army tactical missile system (ATACM) surface-to-
surface missiles with a range of 300 km in January 2002. These were expected to be delivered 
to the South Korean Army in 2004 [18]. 
Therefore, the development and deployment of missile defence systems by the United 
States has contributed neither to reducing the ballistic missile threat nor to stopping or revers-
ing a trend towards a new missile arms race in the Northeast Asian region, in which China, 
Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States have already devel-
oped, possessed and/or deployed a variety of missiles (see Appendix). 
Past and existing measures for missile control and disarmament 
As the report of July 2002 on ‘The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects’ by a UN expert panel 
points out, ‘no norm, treaty or agreement governing the development, testing, producing, ac-
quisition, transfer, deployment or use specifically of missiles exists’ [19]. However, some past 
and existing treaties and agreements, whether bilateral, multilateral or regional, do make 
specific provisions on particular types or aspect of missiles. Those past and existing treaties 
and agreements listed in the UN expert panel report could be categorised roughly into four 
types by their objectives. They are: 
 
• Measures to limit and/or reduce the number of certain kinds of missiles used to deliver WMDs such as 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 1 and 2 (SALT 1, 1972 and SALT 2, 1979), the Inter-
Mediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty, 1987), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1 
and 2 (START 1, 1991 and START 2, 1993), and the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
(SORT, 2002). 
• Measures to limit the deployment of missiles to deliver WMDs such as the Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space 
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Treaty, 1967), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty, 1967) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplace-
ment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and 
the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil (Seabed Treaty, 1971). 
• Measures to control the export of missiles and missile related technologies such as the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime (MTCR, 1987) and the International Code of Conduct against Bal-
listic Missile Proliferation (ICOC, 2002). 
• Measures to implement the prior notification of missile launch such as the Agreement on Measures 
to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America 
and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (1971) and the Lahore Declaration between India 
and Pakistan (1991) [20]. 
 
In contrast to missile defence policies intended to counter the ballistic missile threat uni-
laterally, missile defence policies could also be regarded as co-operative measures to reduce the 
threat of missiles through missile control and disarmament. As we have seen, the development 
and deployment of missile defence systems by the United States involves the risk to nurture 
distrust among major actors in Northeast Asia, igniting a regional missile arms race. This could 
have serious adverse effects not only on co-operative efforts to reduce the missile threat in the 
region but also on the security of the United States. Therefore, what is needed today in the 
region seems to be an initiative to pursue such co-operative measures to reduce the threat of 
missiles in terms of regional security and to nip a new missile arms race in the bud before it 
becomes uncontrollable. 
Such an initiative, however, should go beyond the past and existing agreements and trea-
ties for missile control and disarmament, because they are not necessarily effective to cope 
with current missile issues in Northeast Asia. To illustrate this point, I examine the effective-
ness of the MTCR and the regionalisation of the INF Treaty. 
The MTCR was established by the United States and its six allies in April 1987 in order to 
prevent the proliferation of missiles and related missile technologies. Initially, the guidelines of 
the MTCR ban the transfer of missiles with a payload over 500 kg and a range over 300 km, but 
today it prohibits the transfer of all missiles that could deliver weapons of mass destruction 
regardless their payload and range. Some missile programmes have been stopped or delayed by 
this suppliers’ export control measure [21]. 
However, the effectiveness of the regime has been limited in Northeast Asia as well as in 
the rest of the world. First, North Korea and China have not joined the regime and their mis-
sile export practices have been a matter of a great concern in terms of preventing missile pro-
liferation. Second, the MTCR is not a legally binding agreement and there are no specific verifi-
cation or enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the implementation of its guideline differs from one 
country to the other. Third, the MTCR does not address the issue of existing ballistic missile 
arsenals, ignoring the asymmetry between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. In addition, the fact that var-
ious shorter-range missiles are not regulated under the regime leaves room for a missile arms 
race in the region as we have seen above. Lastly, the MTCR cannot deal with political problems 
such as a regional conflict and arms race that create demand for missiles. This flaw is critical 
especially in Northeast Asia, in which the issues of two Koreas and Taiwan have been the ma-
jor sources of political and military tension. 
10 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005  
 
 
 
The INF Treaty was signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union in December 
1987 and entered in effect in June 1988. Under the treaty, the two countries agreed to abolish 
all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km and this 
agreement was carried out within three years. This treaty is a remarkable achievement in missile 
disarmament, because it for the first time banned all the missiles in a certain category between 
the agreed parties [22]. 
The regionalisation of the INF treaty, however, would not be an effective missile disarma-
ment measure in Northeast Asia. First, it could not regulate various short-range missiles pos-
sessed by Japan, North Korea and South Korea. In the Korean peninsula, even 300 km range 
ballistic missiles or other guided missiles delivering a conventional warhead could constitute a 
grave military threat to both North and South Koreas. A more serious problem, however, is 
that China, which has deployed a large number of land-based medium range ballistic missiles 
and regards them as its major deterrent against third country’s intervention into a China-
Taiwan conflict, would not agree to renounce them. It is not difficult to imagine that China 
may think it unfair and unacceptable to do so considering the fact that the United States is 
deploying an overwhelmingly large number of 1,700 km range Tomahawk ship launched cruise 
missiles (SLCMs) on naval warships that are assigned to the Seventh Fleet in the Asian-Pacific 
area. 
Of course, the foregoing analysis is by no means intended to show the ineffectiveness of 
the past and existing agreements and treaties on missile issues. They have surely contributed to 
the reduction of the missile threat through missile control and disarmament. Nevertheless, it is 
also true that they are not necessarily attuned to address current missile concerns in Northeast 
Asia. Thus, a new design for co-operative missile control and disarmament in Northeast Asia 
seems to be needed today as an alternative to missile defence. 
Towards a regional missile limitation regime in Northeast Asia 
Here, I propose a plan to build a regional missile limitation regime in Northeast Asia. Current-
ly, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States are devel-
oping, possessing and/or deploying a variety of missiles in Northeast Asia and all of them are 
expected to be the member of the regime, except Taiwan, which would be given a semi-mem-
ber or an observer status. The objective of such a regional missile limitation regime should be 
to reduce the threat of missiles in Northeast Asia through co-operative missile control and 
disarmament. Designing such a regime, however, is not simple and easy, requiring careful con-
siderations on a variety of concerns related to missiles specifically in the Northeast Asian set-
tings. In the following part, I focus on four major issues, which seem especially important in 
doing so. They include (1) the diversity of missile capabilities among those states, (2) the limita-
tions of missile defence, (3) dual-use technologies (missiles and space launch vehicles) and (4) 
the issues of two Koreas and Taiwan. 
First, the diversity of missile capabilities that major actors are developing, possessing and/ 
or deploying in Northeast Asia makes it difficult to find the intersections of their strategic 
interests and consequently complicates the work to design a regional regime for missile control 
and disarmament. For example, North Korea may not agree to the ban on medium-range mis-
siles, which Japan and South Korea do not possess but North Korea has already deployed, 
without some forms of compensation. China would resist limiting or reducing land-based me-
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dium-range ballistic missile forces which the United States and Russia have already renounced 
under the INF treaty. The United States, in turn, would refuse the ban of SLCMs such as Toma-
hawk, while North Korea and China may see US SLCM forces as a threat to their security [23]. 
Thus, the diversity of missile capabilities of the states concerned should be taken into account 
thoroughly in identifying a combination of merits and obligations for each major actor, which 
is acceptable to them all, so as to design a regional missile limitation regime. 
Second, such a regional regime should regulate the development and deployment of mis-
sile defence in Northeast Asia. As we have seen before, the development and deployment of 
missile defence systems by the United States could become a major obstacle to achieve a re-
gional agreement on missile control and disarmament in Northeast Asia. Thus, some forms of 
limitation of missile defence should be invented in creating a regional missile limitation regime. 
They could be both regional and global in scope, because the Bush administration has integrat-
ed two different missile defence systems known as the Theater Missile Defence (TMD) and the 
National Missile Defence (NMD) under the Clinton administration, pursuing the construction 
of a global missile defence architecture in co-operation with its friends and allies. The develop-
ment and deployment of missile defence systems by other major actors in the region such as 
Japan and Taiwan should be regulated under the regime as well. 
Third, since it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the development of ballistic mis-
siles from that of space launch vehicles (SLV) from a technological point of view, the issue of 
peaceful uses of outer space should be considered in designing a regional missile limitation re-
gime in Northeast Asia. According to an expert analysis, Japan, which has an advanced space 
programme, is technologically capable to develop ICBMs independently [24]. Therefore, nation-
al space programmes of each actor should be discontinued or severely restricted to prevent 
ballistic missile proliferation. In fact, the development of non-military SLV launch capabilities 
of South Korea has lagged far behind Japan and North Korea, mainly because of the Memo-
randum of Understanding of 1979 on missiles between Seoul and Washington. Nevertheless, 
there is no legal foundation to deny the right for a country to pursue the peaceful uses of outer 
space. Acknowledging that, North Korea, for instance, alleged that the purpose of launching a 
Taepo Dong-1 missile in 1998 was placing a satellite into orbit [25]. Thus, a regional regime for 
missile control and disarmament would need to incorporate measures such as regional co-
operation in the peaceful uses of outer space and the regionalisation of national space pro-
grammes, in order to satisfy interests of each actor in peaceful use of outer space while pre-
venting the proliferation of ballistic missiles. 
Finally, the issues of two Koreas and Taiwan cannot be ignored in designing a regional 
missile limitation regime in Northeast Asia, because they have been political hindrances against 
regional co-operation especially in political and military fields. Besides, there is no regional 
framework for political and security talks involving all of China, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, 
South Korea, Russia and the United States today, except the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
This, however, should not mean that a proposal for such a regime is totally meaningless. 
Starting a process to pursue its establishment could have positive effects on efforts towards the 
peaceful solutions of the issues of two Koreas and Taiwan. Moreover, the thaw of political and 
military tension surrounding those issues, in turn, could improve political environments to 
form a regional missile limitation regime. Confidence-building and threat-reduction measures 
built in a regional missile limitation regime such as security assurances and the notification of 
missile flight-testing could help create this circle of positive feedbacks. 
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On the basis of the foregoing observations and analyses, I present a model road map for 
the formation of a regional missile limitation regime in Northeast Asia. The purpose of the 
regime is to comprehensively regulate missile armaments and missile related activities in the 
region. China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States are expected to 
participate in the regime. The regime would consist of multilateral agreements on missile 
control, peaceful uses of outer space, threat-reduction and confidence-building measures, and 
verification systems. Each one of them could be negotiated separately or combined with 
others. The proposed plan then aims at creating a ‘non-offensive’ missile posture zone cover-
ing the territories of Japan, North Korea and South Korea. Within the zone, each of the three 
countries would be prohibited to have military capabilities to attack ground targets in the 
others’ territories by missiles of any kind directly from its own territories. This is designed to 
be a regionalised solution to the North Korean ballistic missile problem. In order to achieve 
this goal, the process of setting up the regime would be gradual and incremental in view of the 
current political and military conditions in Northeast Asia. More specifically, the regime would 
be established step-by-step through three negotiation stages. 
 
Stage 1 
• Japan, North Korea and South Korea agree to prohibit the development, acquisition, 
transfer and deployment of any missiles with a range over 300 km. 
• Japan, North Korea and South Korea agree to prohibit the development, acquisition and 
deployment of any missile defence systems. 
• China, Russia and the United States, individually or multilaterally, provide security assur-
ances to Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. 
• The six states agree to establish a regional organisation for missile technology control, the 
prior notice of missile flight test, the exchange of data on missile armaments, and inspec-
tion and verification. 
• The six states declare the principles on regional co-operation on peaceful use of outer 
space. 
 
Stage 2 
• Japan, North Korea and South Korea agree to prohibit the development, acquisition, 
transfer and deployment of any missiles with a range over 180 km.  
• China, Russia and the United States start negotiations on the limitation of the develop-
ment, transfer and deployment of missile defence systems and the ban on multiple war-
head missiles. 
 
Stage 3 
• Japan, North Korea and South Korea agree to prohibit the development, acquisition, 
transfer and deployment of any surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles that are de-
signed to attack targets on the ground.  
• China, Russia and the United States start negotiations on the limitation of short- and me-
dium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles deployed in Northeast Asia. 
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Conclusion 
This article focused on proposing an idea of a regional regime for missile control and disarma-
ment in Northeast Asia and intended to avoid going much deeper into a discussion on the 
feasibility of such a regime. With regard to the feasibility, it is fair to say that the present 
political environment in the region is by no means apt to conclude any agreement on proposed 
measures for missile control and disarmament. The point, however, is to present a viable alter-
native to missile defence in light of a very dangerous trend towards a new missile arms race in 
the region. Therefore, this proposal is intended only to become a starting point for a future 
policy discussion on co-operative missile control and disarmament in Northeast Asia. The 
feasibility of a proposed regional missile limitation regime is uncertain. However, at least, it 
seems unquestionable that an initiative to start such a discussion is very much needed today. 
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Appendix: Missiles in Northeast Asia 
China 
System Status Service Branch Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
HY-1 (Ship to Ship) 
SY-1 (Ship to Ship) 
HY-2 (Surface to Ship) 
YJ-6 (ALCM, Air to Ship) 
YJ-81K (Air to Ship) 
AA-12 (Air to Air) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy 
Navy 
Navy 
Navy/Air Force 
Air Force 
Air Force 
80 km 
80 km 
95~100 km 
90~100 km 
50 km 
50 km 
Range 100~500 km    
HY-4 (Surface to Ship) 
SS-N-22 Sunburn (Ship to Ship) 
YJ8-2 (ALCM, Air to Ship) 
YJ-61 (ALCM, Air to Ship) 
AA-10 (Air to Air) 
M-7 (SRBM) 
DF-11 (SRBM) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy 
Navy 
Navy 
Navy/Air Force 
Air Force 
*1 
*1 
150 km 
250 km 
120 km 
185~200 km 
70~170 km 
150 km/190 kg 
300 km/800 kg 
Range 500~1000 km    
DF-15 (SRBM) Operational *1 600 km/500 kg 
Range 1000~5500 km    
Xia/JL-1 (SLBM) 
DF-21 (MRBM) 
DF-21A (MRBM) 
DF-3A (MRBM) 
DF-4 (IRBM) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
*1 
*1 
*1 
*1 
*1 
1000 km/600 kg 
2500 km/600 kg 
1800 km/2000 kg 
2800 km/2150 kg 
5500 km/2200 kg 
Range 5500 km~    
DF-5A (ICBM) 
DF-31 (ICBM) 
JL-2 (SLBM) 
Operational 
Tested/Development 
Tested/Development 
*1 13000 km/3200 kg 
8000 km/700 kg 
8000 kg/700 kg 
*1 Second Artillery Corps 
 
Japan 
System Status Service 
Branch 
Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
ASM-1 (Air to Ship) 
AGN-84 Harpoon (ASCM, Ship to Ship) 
Operational 
Operational 
Air Force 
Navy 
50 km 
90 km 
Range over 100 km    
MIM-104 Patriot-2 (Surface to Air) 
ASM-2 (Air to Ship) 
SSM-1 (ASCM, Surface to Ship) 
SSM-1B (ASCM, Ship to Ship) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Air Force 
Air Force 
Army 
Navy 
70~160 km 
100 km 
180 km 
150 km 
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North Korea 
System Status Service 
Branch 
Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
CSS-C-2 (ASCM, Surface to Ship) 
SS-N-2 Styx (Ship to Ship) 
FROG-7 (Surface to Surface 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy 
Navy 
Army 
80 km 
80 km 
70 km 
Range 100~500 km    
Scud-B (SRBM) 
Hwasong-5 (a variant of Scud-B, SRBM) 
Operational 
Operational 
Army 
Army 
300 km 
330 km/1000 kg 
Range 500~1000 km    
Hwasong-6 (Scud-C, SRBM) Operational Army 500 km/700 kg 
Range 1000~5500km    
No Dong-1 (MRBM) 
No Dong-2 (MRBM) 
Taepo Dong-1 (MRBM) 
Operational 
Development 
Tested/Develop-
ment 
Army 1300 km/750 kg 
1500 km/770 kg 
2000 km/1000 kg 
Range 5500 km~    
Taepo Dong-2 (ICBM) Development  5000~6000 km/ 
1000kg 
 
Russia 
System Status Service 
Branch 
Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
SA-4A/B (Surface to Air) 
SA-12A, B (Surface to Air) 
SA-N-6 (Ship to Air) 
SS-N-2C (Ship to Ship) 
SS-N-14 (SUGW) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Army (a) 
Army (a) 
Navy (b) 
Navy (b) 
Navy (b) 
50 km, 55 km 
6~75 km, 13~100 
km 
45~90 km 
80 km 
55 km 
Range 100~500 km    
SS-21 (SRBM, Surface to Surface) 
SS-N-22 (Ship to Ship) 
AS-4 (Air to Surface) 
AS-11 (Air to Surface) 
AS-17 (Air to Surface) 
AS-18 (Air to Surface) 
AA-10 (Air to Air) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Army (a) 
Navy (b) 
Navy (b) 
Air Force (a) 
Air Force (a) 
Air Force (a) 
Air Force (a) 
120 km 
250 km 
460~500 km*1 
120 km 
50~200 km 
115 km 
70~130 km 
Range 500~1000 km    
SS-N-19 (USGW/Ship to Ship) Operational Navy (b) 625 km*1 
Range 1000~5500 km    
SS-N-21 (SLCM) Operational Navy (b) 3000 km/150 kg*2 
Range 5500 km~    
SS-N-18 (SLBM) Operational Navy (b) 5600 km/1650 kg*2 
(a) Far Eastern Military Command  (b) The Pacific Fleet 
*1 Nuclear/Conventional  *2 Nuclear 
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South Korea 
System Status Service Branch Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
AGN-84 Harpoon (Ship to Ship) 
AIM-7 Sparrow (Air to Air) 
AGM-88A/B HARM (Air to Surface) 
AGM-142 (Air to Surface) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy 
Air Force 
Air Force 
Air Force 
90 km 
54 km~ 
48 km~ 
75 km 
Range 100 km~    
NHK-1 (SRBM, Surface to Surface) 
NHK-2 (SRBM, Surface to Surface) 
Hyunmoo (SRBM, Surface to Surface) 
ATACM (SRBM, Surface to Surface) 
ATACMS Block 1A (SRBM, Sfc. to Sfc.) 
Nike Hercules (Surface to Air) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational  
Operational 
Army 
Army 
Army 
Army 
Army 
Army/Navy 
180 km/500 kg 
260 km/450 kg 
180 km/300 kg 
165 km/560 kg 
300 km/560 kg 
180 km 
 
Taiwan 
System Status Service Branch Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
Hsiung Feng 2 (Ship to Ship) 
AGN-84 Harpoon (Ship to Ship) 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy 
Navy 
80 km 
90 km 
Range 100~500 km    
Nike Hercules (Surface to Air) 
Tien Kung (Sky Bow)-1 (Surface to Air) 
Tien Kung-2 (Surface to Air) 
MIM-104 Patriot-2 (Surface to Air) 
Ching Feng (Green Bee) (SRBM) 
Tien Chi (Sky Spear) (SRBM) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Development 
Army 
Army 
Army 
Army 
Army 
 
135 km~ 
100 km 
200 km 
100 km~ 
130 km/270 kg 
300 km/500 kg 
 
The United States 
System Status Service Branch Range/Payload 
Range 50~100 km    
RIM-7 Sea Sparrow (Ship to Air) 
AGM-88A/B HARM (Air to Surface) 
AIM-7 Sparrow (Air to Air) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy (c) 
Air Force (a, b) 
Air Force (a, b) 
50 km 
48 km~ 
55 km~ 
Range 100~500 km    
AGN-84 Harpoon (Ship to Ship) 
SM-2 MR (Ship to Air/ASROC) 
SM-2 ER (Ship to Air) 
MIM-104 Patriot-2 (Surface to Air) 
AGN-84 Harpoon (Air to Surface) 
AGM-154 (Air to Surface) 
AIM-54A/C (Air to Air) 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Navy (c) 
Navy (c) 
Navy (c) 
Army (b) 
Navy (c) 
Air Force (a, b) 
Navy (c) 
110 km 
45~110 km 
75~115 km 
70~160? km 
110 km 
24~200 km 
184 km 
Range 1000~5500 km    
BGM-109 Tomahawk (SLCM, Ship to 
Surface) 
Operational Navy (c) 1350 km non 
nuclear 
(a) US Forces Japan  (b) US Forces South Korea  (c) The Seventh Fleet 
 
SRBM: short-range ballistic missile (<1000 km);  MRBM: medium-range ballistic missile (1000~3000 km); 
IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile (3000~5500 km); ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile (>5500 
km); SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile ; ASCM: anti-ship cruise missile; SLCM: sea-launched cruise 
missile ; SUGW: surface to underwater guided weapon; USGW: underwater to surface guided weapon 
